Guest column by Jason Scheib

(Ed. note: There are many writers at Football Outsiders, and sometimes its hard to convince people that an article on our site represents "the author says X" rather than "Football Outsiders says X." This is extra true for guest columns. This article should not be taken to mean "Football Outsiders says never punt." But Jason's theory certainly is intriguing and unconventional, and we thought it was worth consideration and discussion. We hope you'll find it as thought-provoking as we did. Be prepared, this article is REALLY long.)

Introduction

When a football team fails to convert on third down, it usually punts. And when it punts, it is turning the ball over to the other team. So why isn't a punt considered a turnover, just like an interception or fumble?

I started with this simple idea and began exploring it as far and in as many different directions as it would take me. Over time, it has grown into a theory that redefines a turnover and uses this new definition to see what a team can do to improve their net turnovers and win more games. This theory presents two significant implications:

• A team would win more games if they never punted, and
• A team that never punts would not just be employing a different strategy but would approach the game in a fundamentally different way, which would further add to their success.

This is not about taking more risks and punting less often. That could cost you games depending on when you decided to punt and when you decided not to. The key is to never punt. Never punting takes away the risk because it allows the averages to work in your favor. It also opens you up to different play calling opportunities, primarily on third down. The two go together and are dependent on each other in order to make this work.

Thanks to Peter Watson for discussing these ideas with me and helping me get this theory this far.

Redefining The Turnover

Every once in a while you will hear a football announcer or commentator say that the outcome of a play on the field was, in effect, a turnover. What they are saying is that it is not a turnover -- at least by definition -- but had the same effect. For example, when a team goes for it on fourth down and fails, it is commonly called a turnover on downs -- but it is not counted as a turnover in the stats.

A turnover is traditionally defined as an interception or a lost fumble, and therefore those are the only events that are included in the turnover ratio. And because of that, it can sometimes be difficult to use the turnover ratio as an indication of how good a team is, considering that interceptions and fumbles are often the result of a bad bounce of the ball. A team may have a good record because of a few lucky bounces and not really because they are as good as their record. Interceptions and fumbles are looked at as momentum changers and turning points in games, and for good reason; they often involve good field position for the team forcing the turnover. But there is no fundamental difference between these events and a turnover on downs.

Or a punt for that matter. A punt may be a controlled turnover, done because of the perceived benefit in field position, but punting is giving the ball to the other team. And in fact it is common for people to say that a team forces the other team to punt. Not that they mean a punt is involuntary, but the effect is the same as forcing any other kind of turnover.

So let’s redefine a turnover as ANY TIME a drive ends by giving the ball to the other team without scoring. This includes interceptions and lost fumbles along with punts, turnovers on downs, and missed (or blocked) field goals. It also includes a successful onside kick as a turnover against the receiving team (I will explain the reasoning for this later on). And so consider the following: If a turnover is defined as any time you give the ball to the other team without scoring, scoring is then defined as not turning the ball over. One or the other happens as the result of each drive. And so we can say that fewer turnovers equals more points, and also that fewer turnovers by the opposition equals more points against you. So then, since both teams have the same number of drives in a game (plus or minus one) the team that turns the ball over less by definition scores on more drives and so tends to win.

If this is a valid definition then we could expect to see a correlation between a team's net turnovers and their win-loss record. To measure net turnovers, let's add these other items into the turnover ratio and see what we get. Here are the results for what I call Actual Turnover Ratio (ATR) for the 2004 NFL season:

And here is a sample of what the full breakdown of these numbers looks like for the top and bottom teams and the league average:

I'm not a statistician, but in looking at these results there does appear to be a good correlation between Actual Turnover Ratio and wins.

(Ed. Note: I'm not a statistician either, but I play one on TV. The correlation coefficient is 0.834, so there's a real correlation.)

For the most part, the teams with the most wins are at the top and the teams with the fewest wins are at the bottom. But that's just one season. Here is the average ATR vs. wins for the 2002-2004 NFL seasons (not counting successful onside kicks, which are rare; I wasn't able to pour through the play-by-play from 2002-2003):

So the statistics match our expectations. And it shouldn't be a surprise, considering that Actual Turnover Ratio is really just the inverse of net points, and net points are essentially what determines whether you win or lose a game. This doesn't discount the role of field position in a game; where a team begins a drive will affect how likely they are to either score or turn the ball over on that drive. But the question needs to be asked: which is more significant, the field position or the fact that the ball was turned over in the first place? Because if Actual Turnover Ratio is any indication, the turnover itself seems to be more significant. And that could have a serious implication in regards to punts. But before we look at punts, there are some other things to look at first...

Onside Kicks, Implied Drives, and Safeties

What about kickoffs? Are kickoffs turnovers? After all, when a team kicks off they have possession of the ball until they kick. So, then, you could say that when you score you maintain possession. The rules of the game require that you then kick off. The rules don't require that you give possession to the other team. If that were the case, then onside kicks would not be legal. So in theory, you could onside kick every time and if successful every time you could keep the other team's offense from ever being on the field. Of course that's not realistic, but in theory you could.

But do we count kickoffs into Actual Turnover Ratio? On a drive you either turn the ball over or score. Now if we count kickoffs into that equation we then would have to say that when you do score you turn the ball over anyway unless you kick onside and recover. So then, almost every drive would end in a turnover. Or, we could say that after you score, it is a new possession. Except that you don't have a first and ten, you have to kick. The difficulty with this is that only turnovers count into ATR, so the fact that you score on one possession and then turn it over on the next 'possession' (kickoff) still results in one turnover towards the ratio and so that is no different either way you word it. And so we go back to the definition of a turnover, where a drive ends by giving the ball to the other team without scoring. So kickoffs can't be turnovers.

Here's something to think about though: what if we looked at a successful onside kick as a turnover against the receiving team? It seems backwards of what we've been saying. How can a team that doesn't have possession turn the ball over? But when a successful onside kick happens against your team, it sure feels like you turned the ball over. And there’s a reason why it feels that way.

It is implied in the nature of the game of football that when you score the next drive belongs to the other team. When your team successfully recovers their onside kick attempt, the other team loses their opportunity at a drive. But it's more than that. It is implied in the nature of the game that the next drive after your score was theirs. And so it is implied that they had a drive. Granted, lost "drive" is one in which they never played a down, but that lost drive still had a result. And since that drive did not end in a score, it by definition ended in a turnover. An implied turnover. That's why a successful onside kick feels like a turnover -- because it is one. This is why a successful onside kick can give you a chance to get back in a game at the end: because it closes the gap in the game's Actual Turnover Ratio by one.

Implied drives can be used to explain more than just successful onside kicks. For a kickoff, punt, fumble recovery, or interception returned for a touchdown, since the return team (or recovering team) did not have a drive, and it was implied that the next drive belonged to them, the implied drive ended with a score instead of a turnover. And so implied drives are counted as drives in figuring Actual Turnover Ratio because they have an outcome of either a score or a turnover.

Safeties are a little trickier to explain, because the team that gets the points didn’t have the ball, and also because they do not then kick off but receive the ball from the other team. But a turnover does not take place at any point in a safety. A drive ends with either a turnover or a score. You have the ball and are sacked for a safety. So you have a drive and it ended in a score. Not a score for you, but the drive still ended with a score, still fitting the definition. As far as the definition is concerned, it doesn't matter who scored, just that the drive ended in a score. And because your drive ended with a score it is implied that the next drive belongs to the other team. By that definition it is no different than a touchdown, which would also be your drive ending with a score and so the next drive belongs to the other team. And in that sense there isn't a turnover on a safety any more than there is when you kick off after a touchdown.

To Punt Or Not To Punt

If a better Actual Turnover Ratio means more wins, the question is: What can a team do to improve their ratio? In taking a look at the components of Actual Turnover Ratio, some of what a team can do are things they already try to do, such as correcting mistakes, trying to find an accurate field goal kicker, or "forcing" the opponents to punt. But the one thing that stands out the most is that punts are not only the one component that is done voluntarily, but also the component that occurs most often. So the question is now: If a team never punts, can they improve their turnover ratio? Let’s take a look at what never punting would do to ATR.

If a team were to never punt, the offensive side (giveaways) of ATR would improve significantly. While punts drop to zero, turnovers on downs would increase, but only by the amount of unsuccessful fourth down attempts. On the defensive side (takeaways), the only component that significantly changes is punts to your team. This is because the other team would be less likely to punt if they had more drives start in better field position. What that means is that the odds of them turning the ball back over to you without scoring is lower. So by not punting, only two other components of your ATR are affected by any significant degree, one on offense and one on defense. On both sides of the ratio the number of turnovers would go down, which means by definition both you and your opponents would score more. The question is which side of the ratio is affected more. If we can show that your giveaways would go down more than your takeaways, the implication would be that by never punting you would win more games.

To find the answer to this, I went through the play-by-play of every game of the 2004 NFL season and calculated the points scored after every drive result. In other words, how likely was a team to score if they received the ball via a kickoff, punt, interception or fumble, etc., and also what was the average number of points per score. These numbers are meaningful because according to our new definition, a score is the inverse of a turnover. These point values came out as follows:

These point values reflect the average field position your team starts from. Higher values mean you have a better average starting field position than lower values. The turnover on downs point value is skewed because most of those are in short yardage situations in opponent's territory. For the purpose of looking at additional turnovers on downs in place of never punting, it makes more sense to go with the 2.80 of fumbles and interceptions, since those can happen anywhere on the field, in your territory or opponent's territory and averaging somewhere around midfield. You could then look at these numbers and say, of course you would want to punt, the numbers prove you are more likely to be scored upon if you go for it and don't make it. But let's look at it more in context.

I also kept track of the number of times each of these events happened per team per game. The average number of drives per team per game was 12.12, with 11.21 having a result (score or turnover) and the other .91 not having a result because time ran out at the end of either half. Out of those 11.21 drives, 3.88 end in scores, 4.88 end in punts, 1.71 end in fumbles or interceptions, 0.38 in turnovers on downs, 0.33 in missed field goals, and 0.03 in successful onside kicks against. And so we can put together the following chart:

The total of the points in the 'Opponent Receives Ball Via' section equals the same as the points scored or about 21.5 (since this is just a league average, points scored equals points against).

So what happens if you don't punt? Of course, just because you are successful on a fourth down attempt doesn't necessarily mean you end up scoring on that drive; you could still turn the ball over. But even if you only ended up scoring one out of those approximately five drives where you now go for it instead, this is what the chart would then look like -- if your opponents still punted. I added an additional item in the chart to count for the additional turnovers on downs that we are figuring at the higher 2.80 point value:

So out of 4.88 drives where your team would traditionally have punted, if now you score on just one of those drives, the other 3.88 count as turnovers on downs at 2.8 points each. And since you score one more time you kick off one more time. So now you would score 27.0352 points and your opponents would score 25.899 (the total of the point values for your opponent’s drives).

We can also invert these charts to show the number of turnovers on each drive, since a turnover is the opposite of a score. The number of turnovers for each drive is, in effect then, the percent of times a team will turn the ball over when receiving the ball each different way. And since you don’t turn the ball over every time you don’t score because of time running out at the end of a half, we can figure in from these numbers the fact that 89% of drives have a result and so 89% of the 5.54 points per score (or 4.93) is the inverse of a turnover. And so the chart would look like this:

The total turnovers are the same both for the total of the results of your drives and your opponents drives at 7.33. And as in the example before, if by not punting you ended up scoring on one more drive than before the chart would look like this:

By scoring on one additional drive, your turnovers now total 6.33 and your opponent’s turnovers total 6.63. And that's with only about a 20 percent success rate of converting the fourth down attempts and then scoring on that drive. The higher that success rate goes, the larger the point difference (and turnover difference) between you and your opponents.

Although the 20 percent success rate seems conservative, we need to figure out what that success rate would actually be. But before we do that, there is an important point to consider: If a team never punts, their offensive strategy completely changes. The difficulty in trying to figure out what a team’s statistics would look like if they never punted is that a team that never punts would have very different stats than the stats we currently see. And that is because this team would be playing a somewhat different game. So let's take a look at how a team that never punts would approach the game differently...

Four Down Mindset

Everybody knows that in football you have four downs to gain 10 yards or you lose control of the ball. But everybody approaches football as if you only have three downs to gain 10 yards or -- most of the time -- you punt. There may be exceptions to that when a team gets close to the end zone, but in general that is the primary approach. Think about that. Convention says that you are better off punting. And maybe that's true if you approach the game as if you only have three downs. The difference is mindset.

That's the difference between saying you should be more aggressive and punt less often, depending on the situation, and saying that you should not punt at all. The first statement is based upon still approaching the game with a three down mindset. The second statement is based on approaching the game with a four down mindset.

So what exactly is four down mindset? It means you look at EVERY first-and-10 as if you have four tries for a first down instead of three. After all, the rules of the game say you have four tries.

How does this affect strategy? Well, primarily it affects what you do on third down. On third down, instead of having the mindset that you need to convert or the punting unit comes in, you have the mindset that all you need to do is get closer to the first down marker so as to put you in a better position to convert on fourth down. So where a third-and-long now usually means a pass, you could attempt a run instead to make it fourth-and-short. On purpose. And so the defense couldn't just key on the pass in that situation. In effect, you are giving yourself one more down, which may sound obvious -- but what that really means is that third down has now become no different than what second down used to be. On a conventional second down you may just try to put yourself in a better position to convert on the next down. Now you can still approach it that way on third down and you just gave yourself an extra down in between.

Would teams really just try to improve their odds of converting on fourth down rather than trying to still make the conversion on third down? Consider this: It’s third-and-10. If you attempt a 10-yard pass and fail to convert, you are faced with a 10-yard conversion attempt on fourth down. If you attempt a run to set up a shorter fourth down attempt and gain no yardage, you are still faced with a 10-yard conversion attempt. Some of the times you will put yourself in shorter yardage to get a first down, and the worst case is that you are in the same position as the first example. So this strategy would improve your odds of converting.

Because you have given yourself an extra down, you can get more out of your offense. You could take a bad offensive team and get more production out of it. Or you could take a good offense and make it great. For instance, a running back that averages 2.5 yards per carry would now be just as effective to your offense as one that averages 3.3 yards per carry in a three down offense. But also think of the effect it would have on an opposing defense, knowing that they would have to stop you four times EVERY time you had a first and 10 instead of the normal three times. That could wear on them.

I mentioned that stats would be different than the ones we currently see. You could expect third down conversion rate to drop, since you are not always trying to convert on third down. You could also expect fourth down conversion rate to drop. The reason for this is that teams now generally only go for it on fourth down in short yardage situations and so the conversion rate is higher. And yet overall there would be more first downs. Why would you convert more often if both third down conversion rate and fourth down conversion rate drop? I contend that fourth down conversion rate is misrepresented. Should it not take into consideration what happens on every fourth down and not just the ones where you go for it? It would then count punts and field goal attempts as well. If you go for it and are successful, or if you make a field goal, you convert. If you go for it and are not successful, or if you punt or miss a field goal, you fail to convert. By that measure fourth down conversion rate in the NFL would have been just 24 percent rather than just under 50 percent. But let's go further still and look at the conversion rate of any first-and-10 series regardless of which down the conversion happened on. The NFL average for this rate for the 2004 season was 73 percent (more on this later). Not punting would increase that rate because while fourth down conversion rate as traditionally defined would go down, fourth down conversion rate as more accurately defined would go up significantly.

Maybe we can use Canadian football as an example of how much the difference of a down can affect a team. There are of course some notable differences between the two games: the field is 110 yards, each team has 12 men on the field and two men in motion on defense. But by far the biggest difference is that in the CFL each team has only three downs instead of four. And that difference changes the whole game. What would you expect to happen to the game if there was a change from four downs to three? More passing since it would be much harder to convert running the ball. More punts. More turnovers on downs. All of these are characteristics of the CFL. The average passing yards per team per game for the 2004 CFL season was 284.1, much higher than the 210.5 for the NFL. Rush yards were lower at 100.9 compared to 116.6 for the NFL. Each team punts an average of seven times per game instead of five. Turnovers on downs are higher (.642 compared to .459). Fumbles and interceptions are higher. And most surprising is that there are more than twice as many missed field goals as in the NFL. Then of course, if you have a harder time converting with one less down, attempting a long field goal may seem like your best option more often. To one degree or another, we could trace all of these differences to having only three downs. And all in all, teams in the CFL average three more turnovers per game than in the NFL (by the definition here) . If the CFL, by approaching the game with one less down, causes the game to change so significantly, is it too much of a stretch to think that approaching American football with a four down mindset would have just as significant an effect to an offense?

A Look At Third Down Statistics

Do teams really approach third down differently than second down? Or do they try to convert on first and second down just as much as on third down, but with less success because there are more yards on average to gain? Part of my argument about four down mindset was that on third down a team might -- on purpose -- just try to get closer to the first down marker to increase their odds of converting on fourth down. But then I can‘t imagine a coach ever saying that they don‘t try just as hard to convert on second down, and that on second down they just try to get closer to the first down marker as to increase their odds of converting on third down. And that thought bugged me. What also bugged me was the thought that maybe I’m exaggerating the effect of four down mindset. In how many situations would it really affect your approach? Maybe it wouldn’t affect third and short because you are still just as likely to run the ball then, and maybe it wouldn’t affect third and very long because then you would still be inclined to pass anyway. And so maybe it would only affect play calling in the third and, say, 7-to-10 yard range, which doesn’t seem that significant.

I realized I needed to look at some statistics to see if my argument was valid. And so I compared the play calling (run vs. pass) of second down and third down (sacks and quarterback scrambles are counted as passing plays). These statistics come from the play-by-play of 32 games during the last two weeks of the 2004 NFL season. While not as large of a sample size as a whole season, it does take into account every team’s abilities and tendencies, and does give a good indication of the difference in play calling between the two downs. And the difference is significant:

On second down, teams called 605 running plays to 746 pass plays, while on third down teams called only 172 running plays to 708 pass plays. Which is 44.8 percent runs on second down and only 19.5 percent runs on third down. But even more significant is the fact that this discrepancy in play calling on third down took place for every yards-to-go situation. So this answered both of my concerns: not only does this show that teams do use a different approach on third down than on second, but it also shows that the difference in approach is just as significant in the third and short and third and very long as it is in the third and 7-to-10 range.

I also calculated the average number of yards gained for runs and passes in each situation. The average yards gained on a run was 4.22 on second down and 4.63 on third down. The average yards gained on a pass was 5.53 on second down and 5.13 on third down. Short-yardage rushing was about the same: the average yards gained on a run when there are three or fewer yards to go was 3.88 on second down and 3.85 on third down. While there may be a perception that running the ball on third and short is tougher than on second and short, the statistics show otherwise. Note also that teams pretty much ALWAYS pass on third-and-10 (98.8 percent of the time). There were only 19 conversions out of 80 when passing on third and 10. Running more often on third down would increase your odds of eventually converting on that series.

We can figure out how many more times teams would run the ball for each yards to go situation if they approached third down with the same play calling tendencies as on second down:

The total change in play calling would then be 250 more runs for an overall percent increase of 28.4 percent. And with the average yards gained per run being less than the average yards gained per pass play, that would then drop the average yards gained per third down play from 5.03 to 4.89. And since we expected the change in third down play calling to cause third down conversion rate to drop somewhat, this change in yardage gained fits that expectation. Now we can see if this information can help us see how successful a team would be by never punting and approaching the game with a four down mindset.

Connecting The Dots

Earlier I mentioned a statistic that measures the conversion rate on any first-and-10 series. This conversion rate, not surprisingly, correlates well to a team’s total offensive turnovers, as indicated by the following chart (using statistics from 2002-2004):

What we want to do now is try and see if we can calculate what a team’s total conversion rate would become if the team never punted and approached the game with a four down mindset. Then we want to see if that decrease in offensive turnovers (giveaways) is greater than the decrease in defensive turnovers (takeaways).

First let’s look at the breakdown of how this conversion rate is figured. Every first-and-10 ends in either a score, a turnover, or a non-scoring first down. The only difference between a first-and-10 (series) and a drive is that you can succeed without necessarily scoring. So the number of series equals: offensive turnovers + field goals + total first downs (a TD counts as a first down but a FG does not). Since scores and non-scoring first downs are conversions, we divide the total of those two by the total of all three for a league average conversion rate of .730. Here are the numbers for the 2004 NFL season:

I have said that third down conversion rate would drop from its average of .376, but it wouldn’t drop quite to the level of second down conversion rate because on third down you have on average fewer yards to go to get a first down than on second down. So we know it would be somewhere in the middle. From the second down statistics I mentioned earlier for Weeks 16 and 17 of the 2004 NFL season that second down conversion rate was .315. That should be pretty close to the average for an entire season, considering the third down conversion rate of those two weeks was .380, which is pretty close to .376. To be consistent we’ll use the .380 rate. By figuring, as I said, that 5.03 yards per play on third down led to a .380 conversion rate, then with a little algebra we can figure the conversion rate with 4.89 yards per play:

.380 / 5.03 = x / 4.89
x = .369

I’m not a mathematician, so this is the best way I know of to figure this rate even if it‘s not the best way. But that said, this .369 rate is in the range of what we expected, being between the second down conversion rate and the third down conversion rate. And more than that, a change in yards per play of only .14 of a yard shouldn’t have very much effect on the conversion rate, so we would expect for it to only drop a little bit. Even if this rate of .369 isn’t exact, it should be pretty close to it. I think it’s reasonable that for our purposes we can then use this rate as our new third down conversion rate under a four down mindset. The league total of 2525 third down conversions would then become 2476 and lead to 49 more fourth downs. To figure what the fourth down conversion rate would be, we know it would drop from its average of .482 when teams go for it but not down as far as third down conversion rate because the average yards to go would be less than on third down. So again, to use some algebra, if the average of 4.94 yards per play on second down leads to the average yards to go improving from 7.73 to 6.99 (or a .740 difference), then with 4.89 yards gained per play on third down we can figure the improvement of yards to go:

4.94 / .740 = 4.89 / x
x = .733

Again, even if this isn’t the best way to figure this, the answer seems reasonable considering that a small change in average yards per play of .05 yards should only have a small effect on the change in yards to go. So then if there is a conversion rate of .380 when there are on average 6.99 yards to go to on third down, we can figure how much that rate would increase when the average yards to go on fourth down would be .733 yards less than on third down:

.380 / 6.99 = x / .733
x = .040
.380 + .040 = .420

This .420 rate goes along with what we expected, being in between normal third down and fourth down conversion rates, and somewhat closer to third down conversion rate, since normal fourth down conversion rate is skewed by a preponderance of fourth-and-short situations.

So back to figuring the change in the conversion rate on any down. we now use this .420 fourth down rate applied to the original 454 fourth down conversion attempts plus the additional 49 fourth downs we figured because of the decreased third down conversions, and also the 2513 punts that are now fourth down attempts. Here is the above chart broken down into conversions per down:

And by not punting and approaching the game with a four down mindset this chart changes to the following:

Which puts us in the range at the top of the chart earlier comparing the conversion rate on any down to offensive turnovers, where a rate of .800+ correlated to 88.3 turnovers. But really all we have to do is divide the 2820 offensive turnovers in that equation by 32 teams to get an exact number of 88.125. That number of turnovers divided by 16 games comes out to 5.51 offensive turnovers per game. So now let’s put that number into the chart showing the number of turnovers per drive result and work backwards. The total of 5.51 turnovers per game causes the turnovers on downs (in place of punts) to be 3.06, since that is the only component on the offensive side of Actual Turnover Ratio other than punts affected when you don’t punt.

The total turnovers now come out to 5.51 for your team, like we said, but 6.79 turnovers for your opponent. Multiplied out over a 16-game season and rounded to the nearest turnover, that becomes 88 turnovers for you and 109 for your opponents, or an Actual Turnover Ratio of +21. And according to the chart shown toward the beginning, this correlates to approximately 11 or 12 wins. And if so, then by never punting and approaching the game with a four down mindset, an 8-8 team could improve their record by approximately 3 to 4 wins on average. And that’s significant.

We can also plug these turnover numbers into the chart showing points per drive result. The outcome there is 31.6 points per game for you and 24.9 points per game for your opponent. Why does this work? Because the difference between giving the ball to your opponent by punting versus turning it over on downs is only about 1 point against you (each) on average, and the increase in your scoring more than makes up for that.

And, as I mentioned earlier, even if my calculations for what third down conversion rate and fourth down conversion rate would be is off somewhat, we know at the very least that third down conversion rate would be higher than the normal second down conversion rate of .315 and that fourth down conversion rate would be higher than the normal third down conversion rate of .380. But even if we wanted to be extra conservative and use .315 as third down conversion rate and .380 for fourth down conversion rate, even that is enough to make never punting work in your favor. If we use those two rates to figure the conversion rate on any down, we end up with a rate of .776 and an average of offensive turnovers per team of 98.91,which plugged into the above chart comes out to 99 offensive turnovers to 110 opponent’s turnovers, or an ATR of about +11. And those are unrealistically low conversion rates and still a significant improvement.

Below Average Offenses And Below Average Defenses

Even if never punting and approaching the game with a four down mindset can be shown to help a team win more games on average, the problem is that most teams aren't average. Many teams are strong on offense and weak on defense, or weak on offense and strong on defense. And some teams aren't strong in either category.

To make sure this works for all kinds of teams and not just the ones with at least an average offense and average defense, I did all of the same calculations for three individual teams that I did for the league average. Those three teams were the 2004 Minnesota Vikings (strong on offense and weak on defense), the 2004 Baltimore Ravens (weak on offense and strong on defense), and the 2004 San Francisco 49ers (weak in both offense and defense and the lowest ATR in the league).

Without taking up a lot of space to show all of those teams' individualized numbers, here were each team's results:

• The 2004 Minnesota Vikings had 86 offensive turnovers, best in the league, and 90 defensive turnovers, among the worst in the league, and finished the season with an ATR of +4 and an 8-8 record. If they were to have never punted and played with a four down mindset, their conversion rate on any down would have increased from .811 to .868 while their offensive turnovers decreased to 58 and their defensive turnovers decreased to 88, for an ATR of +30. This would be an increase in ATR of +26 and approximately a 12-4 record.
• The 2004 Baltimore Ravens had 134 offensive turnovers, among the worst in the league, and 139 defensive turnovers, among the best in the league, and finished the season with an ATR of +5 and a 9-7 record. If they were to have never punted and played with a four down mindset, their conversion rate on any down would have increased from .683 to .783 while their offensive turnovers decreased to 92 and their defensive turnovers decreased to 137, for an ATR of +45. This would be an increase in ATR of +40 and off the chart, so probably 13 wins if not more.
• The 2004 San Francisco 49ers had 145 offensive turnovers, among the worst in the league, and 107 defensive turnovers, also among the worst in the league, and finished the season with a league worst ATR of -38 and a 2-14 record. If they were to have never punted and played with a four down mindset, their conversion rate on any down would have increased from .673 to .736 while their offensive turnovers decreased to 117 and their defensive turnovers decreased to 98, for an ATR of -19. This would be an increase in ATR of +19 and approximately 5 or 6 wins.

If this works for the 2004 49ers, who did not have a strong offense or a strong defense to bail them out when they turned the ball over on downs, it should be fair to say it would work for any team. And not just the average or above average ones.

Exceptions

Up until now I have been talking about NEVER punting. But are there some situations where it may still be in your best interest to punt? Probably yes, although ideally you would want to keep them to a minimum. For example, it’s nearing the end of the game and the outcome is on the line and you find yourself facing fourth down deep in your own territory. If you go for it and don’t convert the other team is in a position to kick a field goal and win the game. Or maybe because you are backed up to your own end zone facing fourth-and-20.

While it may sound like I’m contradicting myself when I say this, I’m not at all. That’s because what I’m advocating here is not an offensive strategy based on risk, but rather one that is based on being conservative. The point of this turnover theory is not so much about eliminating punting as it is about finding a way to improve your Actual Turnover Ratio. The purpose of not punting is to help you win more games, but if not punting in an emergency situation would likely cost you a game then the point is still to win the game. And so any rare times you do punt would normally be at the end of a close game or in overtime.

What about field goals? Does the four down mindset suggest that you should go for it at the expense of a field goal? While some people may argue that there may be an advantage to going for a touchdown as opposed to settling for the field goal, that isn’t necessary with this theory. A field goal means the drive ended in a score, and you didn’t turn the ball over. And that’s all we’re trying to do, have more drives end in scores and fewer drives end in turnovers.

Conclusion

The calculations we made were based on the assumption that even though you never punt, your opponents still punt as normal. But it is just as likely that teams would try not punting against you, especially if it’s working for you. Of course if neither team punts, the playing field is even and you no longer have an advantage. You may, however, cause the other team to punt less and just pick their spots, and that may give you an even bigger advantage.

There are two reasons for this. If a team punts on some occasions and not others the numbers don’t average out the same way they do if they never punt. As I explained earlier, you need to be able to get at least one extra score per game in order to put this in your favor. But if you just punt one or two less times per game, the odds aren't very good that one of those times will end up in a score. You need to go for it each of the five times teams normally punt to get that one extra score every game. Otherwise it's hit or miss, and taking a risk. The other reason is because if you punt some times but not others then you can't really have a four down mindset even if you try to. If you aren't committed to going for it every time, it affects your third down playcalling and there's no way around that.

The irony is that going for it on fourth down is considered a risky way of playing the game, when in fact spreading yourself out over four downs actually allows you to be much more conservative in your offensive play calling. Think about what that means. If a strategy is considered risky because it could cost you winning a game, and it can be shown that by never punting you would win more games, then that would have to be considered the conservative strategy while punting would be the risky strategy. Certainly that would be counterintuitive. Not that the numbers would necessarily average out in your favor in every game, which may be a difficult thing to get past. But they would over the course of a season.

Not only that, but if you never punt it takes the guesswork out of when to go for it and when not to. As it is now, coaches have to take so many things into consideration: the score, the time left in the game, the yards to go to get a first down, who has the momentum, etc. If you never punt, well, then you always go for it no matter what the situation is. And in the long term you’re more successful by doing so.

Turnovers as better defined are the inverse of scoring. A punt is a turnover. Punts are also the most common turnover. The most common turnover is done voluntarily. That at least puts a different perspective on punting. And on top of that the arguments for punting aren’t necessarily supported by the evidence. The fact that you turn the ball over when you punt appears to be more significant than the field position gained by punting.

Something as simple as a traditional definition can affect people’s perception of the game and even how to be successful at it. I hope that even if my argument for never punting isn’t convincing enough, that at least I have successfully challenged some conventional wisdom and maybe it can get some discussion going.

Responses To Feedback

I will attempt here as best as I can to respond to some feedback I have received before this article was published at FO:

1) It seems a bit too optimistic to suggest that if you never punted, you would score on one out of every five drives.

When I was constructing my argument, I first showed that even if you score on just one out of the five drives where your team would usually punt, that would be enough to make this work to your advantage. Then, when trying to figure out what it would really be, my calculations ended up going from 3.88 scores per game to 5.70, or an increase of 1.82. If one more score seems optimistic, that would certainly seem even more optimistic. A lot of this theory is counterintuitive, and I would like to think that this is counterintuitive as well. Whether this is realistic or not depends on how great of an effect four down mindset really has. And so far what I have found seems to indicate that the effect is greater than I had even first thought. But no doubt something that will probably be debated.

2) If a team really played this strategy, it would dramatically change the defensive strategy, which would dramatically change all the ratios which are involved in the theory.

I understand that defensive strategy would likely change, but I’m not sure what a defense could do to counteract your strategy in such a way that would dramatically diminish the benefit. In my mind, there would be more pressure on the defense, not only because of having to defend an extra down each series, but also because it should be more difficult to defend third down given that they would have to be equally ready for both a run or a pass and not just expect a pass. And if the opposition tried not punting as well, they would have to commit to it every time to get the averages to work in their favor, otherwise it could hurt them. If they committed to it every time, the playing field would be even again, and that should be the worst case scenario.

3) It would certainly be a good thing for teams to go to a never punting mindset as soon as they pass the 50-yard line.

I think this assumes that not punting is risky. I tried to make a case that not punting – if done every time – is actually conservative. If you go for it some times and not others, it could hurt you, because you need to go for it on every one of the five times teams typically punt in order to get the averages to work in your favor. Waiting until you cross the 50-yard line means you might only go for it one or at most two extra times. This would also mean playing in a three down mindset for much of the game and not getting the full effect of four down mindset. Perhaps that is why in other analyses such as David Romer’s paper, the benefit of optimizing when you go for it on fourth down only leads to one more win every three seasons. Never punting and playing in a constant four down mindset is simpler and has a greater effect.

4) Considering touchdowns and field goals equivalent as non-turnovers is an oversimplification that is bound to skew the results.

There’s no question the basis of this theory is simple, but I like to think that maybe it is that simple. Actual Turnover Ratio by definition is the inverse of net points. Net points does not consider touchdowns and field goals as equivalent, but ATR does. I would think that if counting touchdowns and field goals as equivalent skewed the results, there would be less correlation between ATR and wins compared to net points and wins. But there isn't. In fact, the first time I ever calculated ATR was for the 2003 season, and when I ranked the teams by ATR, the top 11 teams were 11 of the 12 playoff teams that year. The only way I can picture the results being skewed as a result of this strategy is if either you or your opponents started favoring more field goals in place of touchdowns or vice versa, and if (as mentioned in the next response) opponents may end up with more field goals, any skew there should be in your favor.

5) Taking a truly hard line as far as never punting would lead to a lot of field goals by the opposition, and this analysis doesn’t really account for this. Virtually every four-and-out in your own territory would lead to at least a field goal, which in turn would lead to a kickoff, which would lead to a possession starting in your own territory.

Actually I thought I had accounted for this in my analysis, at least indirectly, in showing the increase in opponents points scored against you. And I think there is an overestimate here on how much opponents would actually score against you. First of all, you would have on average about five fourth down attempts where you now go for it instead of punt. Those fourth down attempts would be at varying points on the field, and maybe two to three (just a guess) would be in your territory. You’ll make some of those, and so maybe a little under two would result in giving the opponent the ball in your territory. And considering that drives starting at midfield end up in a score about half the time (based on my calculations of 2.80 points per drive that start as a result of a fumble or interception which should theoretically average around midfield, and compared to the 5.54 point per score), let’s say that on these drives opponents score anywhere from 50 percent up to even as much as 80 percent, that’s in the neighborhood of one score against you. And if that one score is a field goal, that doesn’t sound so significant.

These are the best answers I can think of for now. Certainly this theory will be debated, and that's good. So far, it's still just a theory. The more this is discussed and analyzed, maybe the closer we'll be to knowing if it really works like my calculations seem to indicate.

Guest columnist Jason Scheib lives in northwest Washington, where he has learned first hand how much trouble punting can cause a team. When not thinking about football strategy, he holds a job which would actually take longer than this article to explain.

Posted by: Guest on 10 Aug 2006