03 Apr 2008
There's a really...reactionary article by Pat Kirwan on NFL.com today that raises some questions about the draft. It raised a lot more questions with me.
Kirwan starts the column by pointing out two previous "myths" about the NFL draft.
Myth No. 1: Just manage the game. After Trent Dilfer led the Baltimore Ravens to a Super Bowl championship the idea that a team really didn't need a great quarterback to win it all started circulating. The myth said that a QB who could manage the game was good enough as long as the defense was above par. That myth caused a few teams to skip on quarterbacks like Drew Brees and Ben Roethlisberger. The fact is, the quarterback position is the most important one on the field. Sooner or later, every offense is going to have to run a two-minute drill to pull out a win and no manage-the-game guy can do that consistently in the heat of battle.
Oof. We have lots of lines to cross here. What's a "manage-the-game" guy, and how do we define him? I remember Tom Brady being the ultimate "manage-the-game" guy in the Patriots Super Bowl season of 2001, and he did a fine job in the two-minute drill to win his first Super Bowl. Ben Roethlisberger was talked up as another "manage-the-game" guy in his first year. Jake Delhomme's final drive in the Super Bowl ended with 1:08 left and with a touchdown pass. It's not his fault he didn't manage John Kasay into sending the ensuing kickoff into his team's bench.
No one has said you need an "above-par" defense and Trent Dilfer to win a Super Bowl, from what I can tell. If you have Trent Dilfer, a solid supporting cast around him, a good running game, and an otherworldly, best-defense-in-15-years-level defense, you can parlay a questionable holding call (I'll always be bitter) into a Super Bowl. There's a huge difference between the two.
This is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If a quarterback doesn't complete a prominent two-minute drill, he remains a "manage-the-game" guy, but if he does, then he's a heat of battle hero.
Myth No. 2: Don't waste a first-round pick on a running back. The Broncos had great success with their running game with late-round backs like Terrell Davis and Mike Anderson, to name a few over the years. The prevailing thought was that other teams should be able to succeed with late-round picks, too. How do you think the six teams that passed on Adrian Peterson feel about that concept? The Broncos' offensive line was pretty darn good and maybe, just maybe, teams made a mistake on their evaluation of Terrell Davis.
This one manages to be both more and less egregious at the same time. Yes, people probably underrated Terrell Davis. Yes, Adrian Peterson is a very exciting football player. I will throw up for mention without further comment that Chester Taylor's yards per carry (5.4) were similar to Peterson's (5.6), and that it would have been silly for the Browns, Buccaneers, Cardinals, or Redskins to take AP considering their holes at running back were already filled.
How could anyone actually believe that running back isn't an eminently replaceable position after this year? Of the top twenty running backs according to DPAR, eight were first-round picks. If you go by yards, ten of the top 20 were first-rounders. The Super Bowl winner used a fourth- and seventh-round pick to put together their running back combination.
Furthermore, first-round running backs had an average-at-best year. The 2007 crop of AP and Marshawn Lynch had good seasons, but the 2006 guys (Bush, Maroney, DeAngelo Williams, and Addai) were 50/50. Ronnie Brown, Cadillac Williams, and Cedric Benson, all top-ten picks, disappointed due to repeated injuries or general suck. Steven Jackson, Chris Perry, and Kevin Jones were all hurt or alternately mediocre owing to the team around them, which is the whole point of why you don't need to spend a first-round pick on a running back. Larry Johnson was middling and Willis McGahee remained so. William Green is out of football and TJ Duckett was a backup. LaDainian Tomlinson was great, but Deuce McAllister missed about the whole year due to injury, and Michael Bennett was a backup. Jamal Lewis had a good year, but Thomas Jones and Shaun Alexander struggled mightily, Ron Dayne was Ron Dayne, and Trung Canidate is out of football.
I could keep going back further, and I imagine that I'm probably preaching partly to the choir here, but how can anyone possibly make the claim that using a first-round pick on a running back is anything but at best a very iffy proposition?
Kirwan's myth of 2008 is this:
Cornerbacks are only as good as the pass rush: The Giants' Super Bowl victory has led some teams to conclude it was exclusively the pass rush with a bunch of average guys behind them in coverage that helped New York shut down the vaunted Patriots' passing attack. This myth should fade quickly, but a number of people came up to me this week and tried to make a case for downgrading corners.
Let's evaluate Kirwan's points one-by-one.
1. You can't play Cover-2 all day and have corners play the flat area every down. All an offense has to do is put trips (three receivers) to one side and the opposite corner is all alone. As for the pass rush, a three-step drop and a ball directed at the receiver who is being single-covered takes the pass rush out of the equation.
Yes, if you stack three guys against a zone, the opposition has to adjust. That's true, albeit a little obvious. His point about the pass rush is a little bizarre and ignores any of the other consequences. A three-step drop and a ball directed at the receiver who's being single-covered is great in theory, but it means that your receivers aren't likely able to get downfield and allows the safeties to push up closer to the line of scrimmage, which affects both the run and the short pass adversely for the offense. It also requires your offense to have a quarterback who can reliably get the ball out in three steps in a uninterceptable location on a pass-by-pass basis, which is rare enough that the idea that a pass rush can be totally removed from the equation with short drops is flawed.
2. Down in the red zone, the fade route to a tall receiver really means the corner has to make a play on the ball and the rush will not be a factor before the fade is thrown.
My verbal response to this was "Meh". Yes, this kind of play eliminates the pass rush, but how often does a corner actually make a successful play on a fade route? Much more often, it's the quarterback making a bad throw or the wide receiver dropping the ball that makes a fade unsuccessful.
3. Sometimes it's the jam of the corner on the receivers that sets up the pass rush.
A reasonable point. The idea is that one fuels the other, which Kirwan correctly mentions in Point #4.
4. Corey Webster is one of the Giants' corners who supposedly is just average. I asked Giants GM Jerry Reese about Webster and his first comment was, "Did you see the interception against the Packers?" Pass rush and corner play work hand in hand, just like an offensive line and a running back or a QB and his receivers.
It's funny. Corey Webster was miserable at the beginning of the year. Execrable. I can't fathom someone watching him play and thinking that he was an NFL-caliber corner. He got benched and slowly got his confidence back, although he was pretty mediocre for the entire season.
And then, he was great in the playoffs. He had some minor hiccups here and there, sure, but all in all, he was very good.
To justify that performance, though, by saying that Webster had a great interception against the Packers? Really? Forget that Webster's failed jam against Donald Driver allowed the Packers wideout to be wide open for a 90-yard touchdown earlier in the game. Webster slipped, which isn't indicative of his skills as a cornerback. It was smply some bad luck at the wrong time, and not something you can really hold against him.
The thing is, Webster's interception was by no means a brilliant play. He was beat. The pass, to me, looked like an obvious miscommunication between by Favre and Driver, with Driver running an out and Favre throwing a curl. After the game, Favre said it was a poor throw. Jeffrey Chadiha wrote for ESPN:
"In fact, he actually thought the pass was in trouble from the moment it left his right hand. Wide receiver Donald Driver was supposed to run a "shake" route on second-and-8 from the Packers' 28-yard line, but Favre's pass sailed behind the receiver after Driver made his out cut. All Webster had to do was step in front of the ball and catch it at the Green Bay 34.
"I just didn't throw the ball far enough outside," Favre said later. "
Alternately, Clark Judge of cbssportsline.com said:
The pass was one Favre completed a thousand times in his career. It was a simple out route, with Driver pushing Webster 15 yards down the field, making a right-hand turn for the sidelines and turning for the ball.
Driver had three steps on his defender and was wide open for the delivery. Only the delivery was three steps behind, hitting Webster between the 2 and 3 of his white jersey.
"I just didn't throw it outside enough. I just didn't get it out far enough," a somber Favre said afterward. "I didn't rise up to the occasion. I have in the past. I expect more out of myself."
Suggesting that Webster made some sort of grand play to make that interception is disingenuous at best. The Giants corner played very well in the playoffs, but that interception is a poor example of it, and one of Kirwan's jobs as a journalist is to be able to differentiate between what a GM tells him and what reality is.
I wonder who actually starts these myths. Is it the team that wants a corner to fall to them? Is it an outside observer who never coached or watched film? Or does someone actually believe you can get by with average guys?
Pat Kirwan, for those of who don't know, was a coach on the high school and college levels, spent eight years with the Jets as a defensive coach, and eventually became director of player administration. He's forgotten more about football than I'll ever know, and there are things he sees and knows to be true that I probably disagree with. His thesis in this article is even correct: cornerbacks can certainly be worth first-round picks.
His speculation and logic in coming to that conclusion within this article, though, is an example of a really disappointing piece from someone within the industry who could -- and should -- do better.
47 comments, Last at 08 Apr 2008, 5:30pm by Matt
The Week in Quotes wraps up with a look at the good, the bad, and the weird from the Super Bowl.
Comments
"I remember Tom Brady being the ultimate “manage-the-game†guy in the Patriots Super Bowl season of 2001, and he did a fine job in the two-minute drill to win his first Super Bowl."
He still IS the ultimate manage-the-game QB. He throws a lame-duck deep ball, and compensates by picking teams apart underneath. He just happens to now have an absolute monster playing WR for him
Pat Kirwan, you got PUNK'D!
Re: 4. Corey Webster is one of the Giants’ corners who supposedly is just average. I asked Giants GM Jerry Reese about Webster and his first comment was, “Did you see the interception against the Packers?â€
What did Kirwan expect him to say?
Perhaps the second thing Reese said "Damn he got luck with that one. He's really pretty shit and we'll be looking to take a new guy in the draft" ...
Bravo, I guess everyone gets there turn in getting their teeth kicked in, You are never as smart as you like to think.
nice analysis.
And as always Kirwans post makes me wonder, what is it about average that people find repulsive and why is it considered so poor.
I think that a secondary worth #16 in the league on its own, combined with an elite pass rush (that presumably does decent against the run too), is a decidedly potent defense that probably costs less than an average top 10 defense. I would say there is merit in that.
Also, I hate how the Denver O-line was the cause of running success, and yet netted 5 pro-bowls and 4 all-pros during this 12 year period (running 1995-2005). Granted both players who made those probowls (Zimmerman and Nalen) have excellent chances at the Hall of Fame, but in this period Denver had better ALY or ASR than Kansas City 6 out of 12 times, and KC had 19 pro bowls and 15 all pros (granted ALY only goes to 2000 so it could be hiding earlier domination on KCs part, but these o-lines were very similar in their dominance, but one gets loads of credit and the other none.
Bill,
If you were in the same cabin with Pat Kirwan at summer camp, I suspect you're the guy who held him down, pressed a tennis racket to his gut, and ran a hair brush over it.
I usually think he's one of the more grounded NFL writers--insightful and less likely to go off on "so-and-so is the greatest of all time" tangents or "I was texting Player X just the other day and he IMed me while I was in the hot tub..." But this is a beautiful vivisection of his piece. A piece which, on the surface, seems pretty reasonable. Just lacking in homework/depth of research and keen analytical thought.
You left out (perhaps intentionally?) at least one first round running back who started this year: fred taylor of jacksonville. (9th overall, 1998)
I went back to 2000 in first-round draft picks because that seemed as good a time as any to stop. '98 had Taylor, but also had Robert Edwards and John Avery, while '99 had Edgerrin James, Thomas Jones, and Ricky Williams.
I'm pretty sure Thomas Jones was in the 2000 class. Point still holds, though.
Bill,
I more-or-less agree with the FO party line that RBs are essentially fungible. However, when one is attempting to smack down an illogical essay, it is usually best to avoid simple mistakes like the Base Rate Fallacy.
From 2000 to 2007 there were 126 RBs drafted in the 2nd round or later, while 24 were drafted in the first round. You argue that exactly as many of the top 20 backs are former first round picks as not. This means that former first round picks are FIVE TIMES AS LIKELY TO BE IN THE TOP 20, with a hit rate of 10/24 as opposed to 10/126.
Naturally this is influenced by the fact that former first round picks are more likely to get carries. So metrics like yards or DPAR are a poor way to get the point across anyways.
The proper argument would be to compare, say, average DVOA of first round RBs to average DVOA of all other RBs. If RBs are fungible there should be no statistically significant difference between these figures.
Come on guys you can't compare Peterson's and Taylor's ypc as an apples to apples comparison. Defenses played very differently depending on who was on the field. With Peterson they had 8-9 man fronts as the norm.
#10 - It doesn't really work that way. Of those 124 total backs, a significant portion of them don't get a chance to play, nor are they really expected to. While yards and DPAR aren't the preferable way to make that point, they're the only realistic ways to evaluate success at the moment. We can't judge backs who didn't play, and the judgement here is of first-round picks versus the expected production of a first-round pick.
#11 - What, with Chester Taylor on the field, teams were going into six-DB sets to handle Troy Williamson?
What happened to Taylor from 2006 to 2007. He was a 4.0 YPC (team averaged 4.1 YPC) to a 5.4 YPC RB.
The other great fallacy is "Team X won the Super Bowl with Talent Y and Gameplan Z, so let's follow that formula." To paraphrase Leo Tolstoy, every bad team is the same, but Super Bowl champions are all different. And sometimes inferior teams win Super Bowls or conference championships because of one decision, fumble, or bad call.
Reserve running backs usually have a higher ypc than the starter. I think the real question is how does Taylor's time as a starter compare to Peterson's. Seeing as he spent roughly half the year as the starter, this shouldn't be too hard to compare.
For my part, I don't think there's anything wrong with taking a back with your first pick, so long as your drafting one as a finishing touch rather than a savior. If you're drafting in the top 10 (and not because you traded to be there), you're probably better off investing that pick in something else. I thought FO's thesis was that non-elite running backs are fungible, not that all running backs are essentially the same. If you already have a contender and there's an Adrian Peterson clone available when your turns up, why not pull the trigger?
As for game managers, I define that as someone who doesn't wow you but doesn't throw a whole lot of picks. It's someone who has enough experience to know where not to throw it, but he's also not hittin' you with bombs or surgically tearing you apart like Peyton Manning. Captain Checkdown might be a good description. Whether it exists or not, I seriously doubt anyone's actually hoping to build their offense around such a guy. You sign a guy like that as a backup or a stop-gap, not because he that's how you want to play every game.
10:
Yes, but you can pick up a couple of lower-round running backs and an undrafted guy or two for much less of an investment than a top-10 back who might not be all that much better than a 3rd-rounder.
Re #13: The same thing that happened to Shaun Alexander in 2006, 2007.
He went from 5.1 YPC to 3.6/3.5 YPC.
I think that having "rules" for the draft is the myth that needs to go away. There is nothing wrong with taking a running back in the first, if he's deserving of a first round pick. Every position has busts, every position has their inherent downsides. It's simply a matter of being able to evaluate talent. If you can't project players well, then you're going to have problems with whoever you draft.
Evaluate players, take the highest rated player you have that won't be around next time you pick, be it running back, linebacker or punter. Of course, it just sounds simple...
Re: #17
Exactly what I thought. I guess he was worth the contract.
I also agree that running backs are a dime a dozen, especially considering how much punishment they take. I don't think the myth is 'don't take a RB in the first round,' rather don't waste a top 10 pick on a RB. Salaries for top 10 draft picks have escalated to the point where it can be argued that spending a pick on a player who may only play 8 seasons, and 3-4 at a high level, is a poor investment. And Terrell Davis is a poor example to put out there as the reason for this trend. On talent alone Davis was considered a first day draft pick, probably a second rounder, if not for the fact that he was recovering from his second operation for a torn knee ligament. It's not that surprising that the rest of the NFL thought he would be an injury risk.
Re #19:
Judging strictly on YPC, he seems to be worth about 1.5 YPC.
Looking at FO's adjusted line yards, he looks to be worth about 1 YPC. Either way, yes, he seems to be worth the contract. I'm *still* trying to decide who I'm more mad at, though:
1) The Seahawks, for transitioning him
2) The Vikings, for the poison pill
3) Hutch, because he obviously wanted out, for some odd reason (even though all public accounts point to him getting along great with everyone)
I lean towards #3.
I thought FO’s thesis was that non-elite running backs are fungible, not that all running backs are essentially the same.
Yes, and even if all RBs were fungible, that wouldn't imply that they aren't worthy of a 1st round pick. Fungible just means that they can be replaced seamlessly with other RBs of equal talent. It doesn't mean that there are lots of RBs with that much talent that are easily available.
The big reason RBs are fungible is not that the talent separation between RBs isn't as wide as at other positions (which would make taking a RB in the 1st round a bad idea), it's because the job of RB is almost the same for virtually every team in the league. Whereas some QBs are ill-suited to particular offensive schemes, and certain WRs are better for the WCO, or some CBs are great in Tampa-2 schemes, but suck in man-coverage, etc, RBs have more or less the same job requirements regardless of what team they are on. Still, some RBs satisfy those requirements much better than others.
Basically, the point is that you can switch Addai with Maroney, and the Colts and Patriots won't miss a beat. You can't do the same with their HOF QBs, though. But that doesn't mean that Addai and Maroney weren't worth 1st round picks.
I should have said 'worth about X more than your average "guard I'd like to replace".'
"98 had Taylor, but also had Robert Edwards and John Avery"
You forgot Curtis Enis. As a Bears fan, I wish I could forget him.
As for Kirwan's higly flawed analysis, maybe this helps explain why he no longer works for an NFL team.
Re:18 "I think that having “rules†for the draft is the myth that needs to go away."
What about the rule that you don't pick a punter in the first round, even if he could put the ball on the one yard line every time ...
No, I think we determined that punter is worth a top-5 pick in the draft.
How do we factor in what I'll call the Benson factor?
Here's a high draft pick, expected to be a franchise back, who so far has failed. His high salary and the commitment the Bears gave him basically ran Thomas Jones out of town (and yes I realize thats an over simplification of the entire situation) (and Jones had been productive in Chicago up to that point.)
Now the Bears are stuck with Benson and are rumored to be looking at picking a back in the first two rounds.
Taking a back in a later round who doesn't have the salary commitment maybe a better idea.
(And yes I know the Bears had the fourth pick, and Benson was considered one of the elite backs in the draft that year, and worthy of the 4th pick, and yes I know that hindsight is 20-20)
How do we factor in the cost of a failed high first round pick against what I would consider the lower cost of a failed later round pick?
As jarring as it is to see hacks like Judge and Chadiha cited to help take down an argument by Pat Kirwan (who I have considerable respect for), this is some nice work, Bill.
And #5 is right on in that
"average" is not necessarily a bad thing to have at certain positions on one's team. No team can have stars everywhere-- if your weakest point is a unit that is merely "average", you've got a championship-caliber team.
" It doesn’t really work that way. Of those 124 total backs, a significant portion of them don’t get a chance to play, nor are they really expected to"
Not only that, how many times have we seen a talented player rotting behind a less talented higher pick, because the team won't cut the expensive high round pick?
We see this pretty often with RBs.
...you can parlay a questionable holding call (I’ll always be bitter) into a Super Bowl.
That Superbowl was nowhere near that close. The Giants were slaughtered in that game. Final score 34-7, or something? You could have given them ten free holding calls and it wouldn't have made the difference in the game.
Timing of the holding call.
How come when I try to print a blog post from this site, the printing gets laid out in center-justify mode?
On the articles with "Print View" options, it prints fine.
But this post for instance center-justifies.
#14: The fallacy is worse than that. The game barely changes from year to year, but when the Giants win the SB, suddenly the efficacy of a great pass rush becomes much more visible - and highly rated. That makes it that much more expensive, both in cash and draft picks, to put one together, which makes it a worse investment than other areas of the team. Basic Moneyball...
I think the fungibility question, for any position, comes down to one thing. I imagine that every position has a "value-versus-talent" curve associated with it. In other words, as a player's talent increases, so does his value, but the relationship is certainly not linear. Different positions probably have different relationships.
Most positions probably drop pretty sharply at the left end of the curve, because replacing an "average starter" with a street free agent hurts you pretty bad. It's probably worse for defensive positions and line positions than for offensive skill positions, since the offense chooses where in the defense to attack, and which skill players to emphasize.
I would imagine RB probably is pretty flat in the middle--increasing from an average to an above average running back (see, Edgerrin James in Arizona) has far less an effect on the running game than upgrading your O-line. But the curve probably turns up at the end, because, going from an above average to an elite RB has a dramatic effect even if you have a bad line (see Ronnie Brown in Miami).
For comparison, I would imagine that the curve probably never flattens out, and even asymptotes, for positions like corners and O-lineman, where the other side can choose where to attack. Going from an average player to a very good player has a strong effect, because it starts to shut down one side of the field, but going from a very good player to an elite player probably has almost no effect because teams simply attack the other side, which they were mostly doing already. In other words, upgrading a pro-bowl RG to the greatest RG ever won't do much, because teams were already attacking the left side of the line more, and will continue to do so.
#17
Hutchinson was on the Vikings in 2006, as was Chester Taylor...I think a more settled right side may have helped more.
Oops, correction...the last paragraph should start
"I would imagine the curve never turns up, and even flattens out asymptotically, for postions like corner and O-line..."
I don't know about that, MJK. I mean, a corner like Champ Bailey gives a great advantage to your defense. Also, as far as the OL, when you run the ball, it's the offense that decides where to attack. When passing, an elite LT would allow other players to get help, while a pro-bowler might do the same thing while allowing more hurries ans sacks.
All in all, it seems to me that at RB just like at any other position, you need talented players. Anyone can run through a 10-foot wide hole, but a faster, more elusive back will still get more yards out of it. Same with a small hole, or even a non-hole. So I don't know what to make of all this RB thing. It's not like AP wouldn't have been an out-of-this-world steal in the 2nd round...
Re: 33 ... Why else did the Giants win the Super Bowl? They did what no other team had done all season. They stopped the Patriots by hassling Brady.
Theoretically you could say that Manning QBing and MVPing the team to victory shows the efficacy of taking a QB #1 overall (we know he came from a trade with the Chargers) but he just wasn't that important.
Quite simply the defensive line were the key to the game (as well as to playoff success given they beat two of the best o-lines in the Packers and Cowboys).
It's a copycat league but nothing else about their team is worth copying so it accentuates the value of the d-line.
I would imagine RB probably is pretty flat in the middle–increasing from an average to an above average running back (see, Edgerrin James in Arizona) has far less an effect on the running game than upgrading your O-line.
But there are 5 players on the O-line, so upgrading all of them from average to above average had better have more of an effect than upgrading 1 RB. Subjectively, I'd say the spread in talent at RB is probably less than that at QB, WR, LT, or CB, but probably greater than that of interior linemen (on offense and defense), and similar to that at LB. I'd say a very good RB, just like a very good LB, would be a perfectly reasonable way of spending a 1st round pick.
Good point, Alex.
Timing of the holding call.
No offense, Bill, but you really need to let it go. Sorry, but even if it had come at exactly the right moment, the Giants weren't likely to win that game. When you lose by 27 points, I find it very hard to believe that changing one play, at any point in the game, could have made you likely to win. If you're referring to Jessie Armstead's pick-6 that was called back, then I'd point out that even with that, the game only would've been tied, and the Giants would've had to score some points on offense to win, which they hadn't done in the 7 possessions they'd had before that point (or on any of their subsequent possessions). Let's review what happened on those 7 possessions:
-The Giants gained 28 yards in 22 plays and got 1 first down, never advancing past the 50 yard line.
-Kerry Collins went 3-13, for 17 yards, with 1 sack and 1 interception. 2 of his completions were for 2 yards on 1st-10 or 2nd-10.
-The Giants had one successful play, a 13 yard pass that got them their only first down, and moved the ball to their 14 yard line.
You're telling me that the Giants were likely to get any points on offense, given that performance? Not to mention that Baltimore had already shown that its offense could score on the Giants defense, so the Giants offense would have likely had to score multiple times. I seriously doubt that would have happened if only 1 penalty had been erased.
Sorry, but the Ravens won that game because they were the better team and they thoroughly outplayed the Giants. Let it go, Bill.
Rich,
don't you think you are stretching the definition of "manage the game" QB to include one who sets numerous NFL records and is named the MVP of the league by the AP?
I agree with you about his accuracy on the long pass, but puh-lease, this is ridiculous. Brady is a superb QB and you of all people shouldn't saddle him with the "manage the game" label.
The label "game manager" implies a QB who lives off the running game and only throws the occasional pass to keep the defense honest. Think Bob Griese. There are lots of grades between "game manager" and "best QB ever", and while Brady isn't the latter, he's a lot closer to it than to deserve the former label.
As for the easy replaceability of RBs: that's what the Pats' ownership thought when they let Curtis Martin walk away and sign with a division rival. Big, stupid mistake. There are lots of RBs but very few great RBs, and it's important that management know the difference between a Tomlinson or Peterson and a Reggie Bush or Ron Dayne.
As for the point about CBs, it seems weird in a game where the last two TD passes were thrown when CBs fell down that anybody would doubt the importance of good CB play. Of course it helps to have a good pass rush, but the Giants had the same pass rush on Week 17 when Brady and Moss showed just how easy it is to beat weak corner play.
So I guess I'm saying I find it odd that so many people buy into the flavor-of-the-week analysis when it comes to looking at the recent Super Bowl. The Giants played extremely well during the playoffs, but I wouldn't want to start modeling my franchise after them quite yet. At least not to the exclusion of other models, such as those of the Colts and Pats.
I would add to 42 that there's a difference between being a good game manager -like Brady- and being a game manager, period. And also that, apart from throwing little, a game manager's defining characteristic is avoiding turnovers.
I haven’t seen a superbowl replay but my recollection is that Webster broke up a late game Brady-to-Moss pass that could have won it for the Pats. I appreciate Eli-Tyree, but Webster’s play also was crucial to victory. Brady/Moss in 2007-2008 was record-setting…Webster did a helluva job and we Giants fans are appreciative!
re 31, 41: I can't help but think of a comment attributed to Sammy Baugh after the Bears beat the Redskins 73-0 in the 1940 championship game.
Apparently, on Washington's first possession Baugh's pass from the endzone unluckily hit the goalposts, when his receiver was wide open for a long TD.
Asked after the game how a big TD there might have changed the outcome of the game, Baugh replied "it would have made the score 73-7"!
I suspect the impact of Armstead's INT in that Superbowl would have been similar.
PS There was nothing questionable about the call. Dilfer was trying to dump a short pass to his RB who was held by a D-lineman. Pretty easy call. I'm a Bengals fan who hates the Ravens, so I have no ulterior motive for this opinion.
PPS I absolutely hate this stupid, meaningless phrase "manage the game" which has become so popular in recent years. Every QB has the same job: make throws.
I nominate this entire comment thread for deletion or relocation to the irrational Brady vs. Manning forum, based on the inflamed passions of partisans here arguing about which QB is a better "game manager."
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