2014: Year of the Short-Yardage Pass

by Scott Kacsmar

There is no forgetting how the 2014 NFL season ended, no matter how much the people of Seattle may want to try. The run-based Seahawks went away from Marshawn Lynch and threw an uncharacteristic slant from the 1-yard line with the Super Bowl at stake. Malcolm Butler beat Ricardo Lockette for the interception, prompting many fans to brand this the worst play call in NFL history.

At the very least, this serves as a great case study for short-yardage play-calling. Even though none of the first 108 passes thrown from the 1-yard line in 2014 were intercepted, we have to remember New England's defense was ranked 32nd against short-yardage runs. While the sample sizes on such plays are not very big for each team, the league-wide numbers show some clear trends. One of them is that running is more likely to convert than passing. Using a quarterback to run the ball, like on a quarterback sneak, is most effective.

However, despite its final play, 2014 was an effective season for the short-yardage pass. Offenses had their highest conversion rates since 2009 when passing on third-and-1, third-and-2, fourth-and-1, and fourth-and-2. Meanwhile, quarterbacks had their worst conversion rates since 2009 when rushing on third-and-1 and third-and-2.

The good news was the volume of quarterback runs improved in 2014. In 2013, there was a 35 percent decrease on third-and-1 runs by the quarterback compared to 2009-2012. In 2014, there were 134 quarterback runs on third down with 1 or 2 yards to go, the highest total since 2009.

In addition to updating previous data, we'll look at the short-yardage success of 2014 teams.

Note: All data is for the regular season only and excludes spikes, kneeldowns, intentional safeties, and botched kicks. Plays including offensive penalties that cause the down to be replayed are excluded. This happened three times in 2014, including two short-yardage runs by Colin Kaepernick and Robert Griffin against Dallas. Since the down is repeated, these plays do not officially count as a conversion attempt on third or fourth down. Passes include sacks. The only plays studied are on third or fourth down with 1 or 2 yards to go, because these are the most important short-yardage plays that essentially decide if the offensive drive will continue. Most data goes back to 2009.

Third Down

Our first table looks at the summary of plays on third-and-1 and third-and-2 since 2009:

It is probably no coincidence the non-quarterback runs on third-and-1 have the most consistent conversion rate, working more than two-thirds of the time. They are the most common call with the most data, but what is it about offenses getting so pass-happy when an extra yard is needed on third-and-2?

Including scrambles as passes, teams run the ball 70.9 percent of the time on third-and-1 since 2009. When it's third-and-2, teams run the ball only 31.0 percent of the time. You expect to see a push towards the pass since the sneak really loses its effectiveness at two yards, but a drop of nearly 40 percentage points seems severe. With all of these short-yardage stats, we don't have data if "1 yard" really meant 1 inch or 54 inches. The spot of the ball would affect play-calling, but I still think 2-yard plays deserve more regular running calls than teams currently use.

Clearly, there is a bigger decline in success from 1 yard to 2 yards with running than there is passing, but running has produced a higher conversion rate in each of the last six years. One problem with running may be that too many teams telegraph the play by loading up a big formation, which the defense can counter with its own mass of humanity, making it hard to get a good push. If teams ran out of normal personnel more often in these situations, we may see even better results.

Does a faster pace help teams in short-yardage situations? I have no data for that. It should be stressed that no-huddle stats, especially for older seasons, are too unreliable to use without actually going to the tape to collect the data. From the plays I watched, there was no obvious connection between the pace of snap and success of the play. Sometimes the offense may catch the defense out of position, but other times the quick snap can lead to a disaster behind the line of scrimmage.

The quarterback's control of the snap is big, but so is his running in these situations. Why did quarterbacks only convert 73.3 percent of their third-and-1 runs in 2014? First, let's look at the summary of all quarterback runs on third-and-1 since 2009. The "Quarterback dive" is basically the play Cam Newton has mastered in Carolina. Some may call it "QB Power," and you know it instantly when you see him take that direct snap and plow ahead with little resistance.

You have to love a play that works 86.8 percent of the time on third-and-1 like the quarterback sneak. In 2014, sneaks were 49-of-61 (80.3 percent), which is down from previous years, but still great. What also dragged the 2014 numbers down were nine botched snaps/handoffs. Yeah, the Colts actually turned a botched handoff into a first down against the Giants, but that's the highest total of botched plays in the last six years.

Notice the 39 conversions on 40 scrambles. How can you have a third-and-1 scramble for no gain that doesn't get counted as a sack? Mike Glennon showed it's possible against the 2013 Rams. I think the original play-by-play correctly said scramble, but the NFL changed it to a "left end" run to avoid giving Janoris Jenkins a 0-yard sack. Even though the game was played the week of Christmas, someone wasn't in the giving mood. Any failed scramble on third-and-1 should be a sack, which is why you could argue the numbers are a little misleading here in giving too much credit to the scrambling quarterback. Fortunately, there have only been 65 sacks on third-and-1 since 2009, so it's not a common play. We also know many of those 65 sacks did not include any kind of scramble.

The quarterback dive has been a very successful play, but only four different quarterbacks have used it since 2009. You know Cam Newton (12-of-14) has made it part of his arsenal, and it's no surprise that Tim Tebow (6-of-6) often used it as well. Michael Vick went 4-of-5 on the dive with the Eagles. Believe it or not, Matt Hasselbeck was the other quarterback to call his own number with the Seahawks in 2010. That play was a bit of a clusterfudge against San Diego. While Hasselbeck ultimately converted for the first down, Seattle was unable to get the field goal unit ready in time for the kick before halftime. If Seattle knew it had converted, Hasselbeck should have been able to spike the ball. Ron Winter's crew was not on top of the situation, as usual.

Quarterback bootleg runs have been a successful trick in the past, to which Peyton Manning can attest. They are the only two short-yardage runs he has attempted since 2009, excluding a botched handoff in 2013. But defenses were able to sniff out some pretty bad bootlegs in 2014 from Andrew Luck (vs. Houston), Ben Roethlisberger (vs. Indianapolis), Jay Cutler (vs. Atlanta) and Carson Palmer (vs. Washington). From 2009-2013, the bootleg worked on 29 of 33 (87.9 percent) short-yardage runs. In 2014, the bootleg only worked on five of nine (55.6 percent) plays. Cam Newton had three of the successes.

Fourth Down

The following table looks at the summary of plays on fourth-and-1 and fourth-and-2 since 2009:

While we wait to see more fourth-and-1 attempts each season, at least teams are calling a wise split of plays in these situations. In 2014, offenses ran the ball on 73.6 percent of fourth-and-1 plays. The conversion rate on passing (57.1 percent) was the highest since 2004. The quarterback sneak was 25-of-30 (83.3 percent), though the overall percentage still trails the third-and-1 sneak.

Here's the summary of all quarterback runs on fourth-and-1 since 2009:

When 2 yards are needed, running is ignored even more on fourth down than it is on third down. In 2014, offenses called a pass on 84.1 percent of fourth-and-2 plays. Granted, time is usually more of a factor here, with 28 of the 44 plays occurring in the fourth quarter. Eight plays came in the final minute of a half, so teams are somewhat forced to throw and get out of bounds to stop the clock.

Regardless, passing has of course been less successful than running, with teams converting just 46.0 percent of their fourth-and-2 pass plays since 2000. The 2014 season rate was respectable at 55.6 percent.

While these are regular-season numbers, this is another case where the most memorable play from 2014 happened in the playoffs. The balanced Dallas Cowboys decided to go with an empty backfield and throw on fourth-and-2 in the fourth quarter against the Packers. Dez Bryant caught the ball, and then he didn't. I refuse to bash that throw-and-catch effort, but it is baffling that rushing champion DeMarco Murray was not in the backfield on that play.

That's the problem with this pass-crazed strategy when a team needs 2 yards. We are not even seeing teams threaten the defense with a run. On last year's 36 passes on fourth-and-2, only three of them used play-action. The results were even harsher in 2013. On 32 fourth-and-2 passes, only one used play-action, while another play was a fake punt. The Steelers had both of those plays, and they had the only completion with play-action on fourth-and-2 in 2014: a touchdown pass to Matt Spaeth against Baltimore. So on 68 fourth-and-2 passes in the last two years, we saw teams use an empty backfield (five passes) more than they used play-action (four).

Quarterbacks are paid a lot of money to make big throws, but you don't need a lot of big throws to gain a yard or two in this league. Here is the five-year summary of each short-yardage play type:

Quarterback Effectiveness

When you look at these quarterback conversion rates since 2000 (minimum 20 attempts), it's impossible not to see overall quarterback talent has little to no impact on short-yardage rushing success (active players in bold):

Tom Brady falls behind Chad Pennington in conversion rate, but he's still far ahead of everyone in attempts and conversions. Two botched snaps hurt Brady's numbers in 2013, but he was actually stopped twice on the quarterback sneak in 2014, by Denver and Minnesota. That hasn't happened to Brady since 2002, when Minnesota and Tennessee stopped him. He also had his first short-yardage scramble since 2007, snapping a streak of 36 short-yardage runs that were all sneaks. I would love to be able to break down the types of runs for everyone listed, but I currently only have that data back to 2009.

Joe Flacco had a very successful 2014 season, converting 12 of 14 short-yardage runs. Cam Newton was right there with a 15-of-18 season. Newton's career conversion rate may not look impressive, but consider he is 14-of-16 on the sneak, and all but one of his seven scrambles were on third-and-2. He is 22-of-29 on the quarterback dive, so he definitely runs differently than most quarterbacks on this list.

Pittsburgh offensive coordinator Todd Haley only called two quarterback sneaks in 2012-13 out of fear that Ben Roethlisberger would be injured. In 2014, Roethlisberger converted all three of his sneaks, but nearly damaged his masterpiece game against the Colts with an ill-advised bootleg in the final minutes.

Russell Wilson and Josh McCown were just added to the rear of the list. In Wilson's case, he had two botched handoffs last season, which is something you worry about with the read-option stuff. Wilson had a fortunate season in that Seattle recovered each of his 11 fumbles. Still, this is an area where Wilson's height may limit him. He doesn't have the big body to push the pile like a Newton or Roethlisberger. Wilson is 5-of-8 on the sneak in his career.

Matthew Stafford does not have enough attempts to qualify yet, but he is 13-of-13 on short-yardage runs in his career (converted all 10 sneaks). Maybe he should run more. Someone who should probably run less is Robert Griffin, who is only 7-of-15. He is the only quarterback I ever tracked (minimum 10 runs) that was under 50 percent. Griffin only has two sneaks (one successful), so his runs are usually from the option/zone read.

No matter whether you're tall or short, fast or slow, lean or JaMarcus, quarterbacks should subscribe to the "shortest distance between two points is a straight line" theory and run more sneaks on crucial downs. We know the goal sometimes in the game is to break tendencies and hit a bigger play, but when you absolutely need to convert the first down, more runs and more quarterback runs are the solution.

2014 Results

Finally, we close with a look at the short-yardage results for 2014 offenses and defenses. For the sake of sample sizes, I combined both downs and distances together for an average of 47 plays per team. For offenses, the pass ratio (Pass%) includes scrambles as passes. Teams are ranked by conversion rate (best to worst).

The top (Denver) and bottom (Washington) offenses in conversion rate have the same ranking in DVOA, but the Chiefs oddly rank fourth in DVOA and 27th in conversion rate. Kansas City played the sixth-toughest schedule in 2014 and tied for second in the league with seven touchdowns on short-yardage plays.

Pittsburgh had the top short-yardage passing offense, converting 16-of-20 plays (80.0 percent) with a league-best 11.9 yards per play. The Patriots actually ranked last with an 8-of-20 conversion rate (40.0 percent) and only 3.8 yards per play.

The Broncos and Giants were the only teams not to have a quarterback run, so there's a Manning brother thing. Five teams converted all of their quarterback runs with Oakland (seven plays) and rookie Derek Carr standing out. Don't say I never wrote a good thing about him. The Bengals were also good with a 12-of-16 rate as Andy Dalton did the sneak well and the offense that was the league's most run-heavy unit in short yardage (71.4 percent). Jeff Fisher's Rams threw the ball the most (61.8 percent).

It's no wonder the Panthers asked their quarterbacks to go 17-of-20 on short-yardage runs. The regular runs were just 3-of-9, tied with Oakland (4-of-12) for the worst conversion rate in the league.

Go figure, but Seattle led the league with a 26-of-30 conversion rate (86.7 percent) on short-yardage runs. I know, the Super Bowl was second-and-1, but it might as well have been fourth-and-legacy. Yet Ricardo Lockette got his number called over Marshawn Lynch.

Here are the defenses.

Yep, the Patriots ranked dead last in conversion rate, DVOA and yards per play allowed, yet came away with the biggest goal-line stand you could imagine.

Kansas City looks good again, with the DVOA to match the conversion rate. There weren't any huge discrepancies here like on offense, but Detroit is fifth in DVOA compared to 19th in conversion rate. It helps when you don't allow many big plays.

Carolina allowed five conversions on 16 passes, but I'm more impressed by the Colts only allowing 0.5 yards per play on 15 passes (five conversions). Green Bay was the next closest team in lowest yards per play (2.7). Surprisingly, Seattle allowed the worst rate of conversions at 77.8 percent (14-of-18). Right ahead of them was Gus Bradley's Jaguars, so that may say something about taking advantage of the Pete Carroll scheme with short passes.

Denver faced five quarterback runs and stopped them all cold, including an aforementioned Brady sneak. That's impressive. Oakland was the only defense unchallenged, and no team saw more quarterback runs than Cleveland (eight conversions on 13 runs). Eight teams failed to get a stop, but Tampa Bay was the worst offender with six plays.

Even the best defenses against short-yardage runs still allow a first down half the time. Kansas City (13-of-26), St. Louis (7-of-14) and Arizona (8-of-16) all tied for the lead, but the Rams had the lowest yards per carry (1.6). New England was actually not last in conversion rate, but ranked 31st (85.7 percent on 18-of-21 plays). The Falcons bring up the rear, allowing a conversion on 19-of-20 short-yardage runs. Man, just last week we had the Falcons as the worst defense at forcing failed completions.

We might only be talking about 1,500 plays in a season, but these are crucial moments in games. The 2014 season will go down as the year where the best short-yardage running team threw an interception from the 1-yard line in the Super Bowl against the worst short-yardage defense.

At least that should be the last time we see anyone make that call. Learn the hard way.