Pederson-Kingsbury

Historical Aggressiveness Index, 1983-2020

Earlier, this week we took a look at Aggressiveness Index numbers for 2020. Today, we're going to look at historical Aggressiveness Index going all the way back to 1983.

Aggressiveness Index numbers center around 1.0 and generally describe how much more (or less) likely each coach is to go for it on fourth down compared to his peers; for example, a coach with 1.20 AI is roughly 20 percent more likely to go for it than an average coach historically would in equivalent situations. There are other methodologies now for measuring fourth-down aggressiveness, mostly based on win probability analysis: for example, the EdjSports head coach rankings or results spit out by Ben Baldwin's fourth-down simulator. Each methodology will have small differences in how it ranks the coaches, but Aggressiveness Index differs from the others by measuring coaches not against what they should do but against the actual decisions made by coaches themselves.

The Aggressiveness Index excludes obvious catch-up situations: third quarter, trailing by 15 or more points; fourth quarter, trailing by nine or more points; and in the last five minutes of the game, trailing by any amount. It also excludes the last 10 seconds of the first half, and it adjusts for when a play doesn't actually record as fourth-and-short because of one of those bogus delay of game penalties that moves the punter back five yards. Only regular season is included.

As we noted on Tuesday, those historical Aggressiveness Index baselines are a lot more conservative compared to how coaches are making decisions in today's NFL. Philadelphia's 2017 Super Bowl title helped push along a small-scale analytics revolution on fourth downs. Teams are not going for it as much as analytics would suggest, but since 2018 they are going for it a lot more than they used to. Last year, coaches went for it roughly 60% more often than we would expect based on historical baselines. 

We last took a look at historical Aggressiveness Index back in 2013. Since then, we've tweaked the formula to lower the strength of plays when the offense was on its own side of the field. These attempts were previously overweighted so that one random go in an unlikely situation would have a outsized effect on the overall AI. We've added 16 different years of play-by-play to our historical data, both 1983-1990 and 2013-2020. And we've added the last three years, where the league as a whole has been much more aggressive than in years past. This seems to be concentrated in two parts of the field: inside the 10 and between the 35-yard lines. Go-for-it rates between the opponent's 10- and 35-yard lines are essentially unchanged.

A look at just the top dozen head coaches with a minimum of one year shows you how much things have moved in the last couple of seasons. The top five head coaches, and eight of the top 10, were coaching in the last two seasons. On the other hand, Vic Fangio of the Broncos (0.62 AI) is the only current head coach in the bottom 20, again with a minimum of one season.

Highest Aggressiveness Index, 1983-2020
(min. 1 season)
Rank Coach Years AI Att Opps Rate Exp Att
1 Kingsbury 2.0 2.45 34 196 17.3% 13.9
2 Stefanski 1.0 2.38 14 80 17.5% 5.9
3 Rhule 1.0 1.89 20 89 22.5% 10.6
4 Pederson 5.0 1.89 83 527 15.7% 43.8
5 Kitchens 1.0 1.84 11 93 11.8% 6.0
6 Cameron 1.0 1.81 13 91 14.3% 7.2
7 LaFleur 2.0 1.71 28 180 15.6% 16.4
8 Nagy 3.0 1.68 34 305 11.1% 20.3
9 Chudzinski 1.0 1.65 12 114 10.5% 7.3
10 Vrabel 3.0 1.59 23 257 8.9% 14.4
11 Brooks 2.0 1.54 18 203 8.9% 11.7
12 Coslet 7.8 1.54 95 796 11.9% 61.6

The surprising names there are the older coaches, not the more recent ones:

  • Cam Cameron went for it on 8 of 11 qualifying fourth-and-1s for the 2007 Dolphins, as opposed to a historical coach average of 39%. He also went for it on both fourth-and-2 and fourth-and-3 in the second quarter against Oakland in Week 4. However, his numbers are a little juiced by that legendary game that the Steelers and Dolphins played in a Week 12 monsoon, where Miami went for it twice on fourth-and-long rather than attempting field goals over 40 yards.
  • Rich Brooks coached the 1995-1996 St. Louis Rams and loved his fakes. In Week 9 of 1995 againts the Eagles, the Rams ran a fake field goal to convert fourth-and-6 in the second quarter and then a fake punt to convert fourth-and-5 in the third quarter. Brooks also had the Rams go for it on 13 of 19 qualifying fourth-and-1s over the two seasons, although he never went for it on 15 qualifying fourth-and-2s.
  • I hope you will forgive me for not going through almost eight full years of Bruce Coslet teams, but Coslet might be the most surprising name on our list as the most aggressive coach of the previous century over a much longer period of time than these other top coaches. Coslet stood out for going for it instead of kicking long field goals from "no man's land," between the opposing 31 and 37. The historical average in these situations is to go for it 27% of the time. Coslet had his teams go for it on 32 of 53 qualifying opportunities, or 60%. Coslet also wasn't afraid to be really aggressive on fourth-and-short. For example, in late 1996 after taking over the Bengals he had Jeff Blake throw a 12-yard pass on fourth-and-2 in a tied game against Baltimore Week 15, then had Blake throw a 16-yard pass the next week on fourth-and-1 when the Bengals were losing to the Oilers by less than a touchdown in the third quarter.

They don't tend to keep coaches for very long but you can see the analytic angle of the Cleveland Browns with Kevin Stefanski, Freddie Kitchens, and Rob Chudzinski on the table above as well as Hue Jackson coming in high on the table below.

Before we get to a very, very big table with 131 different head coaches, here's some other data about going for it in specific situations:

  • There are 11 different head coaches with a minimum of three seasons who have gone for it more than half the time on qualifying fourth-and-1 opportunities. The top six are all recent coaches, with Mike Vrabel, Doug Pederson, and Matt Nagy all over 60%. Don Coryell might be a surprise, at 54%. Then come three longer-tenured coaches including Bill Parcells (53%), Sean Payton (52%), and Sam Wyche (52%).
  • The head coaches with a minimum of three seasons who were least likely to go for it on fourth-and-1 include Butch Davis, Brian Billick, and Mike Nolan, all at 21%.
  • Doug Pederson has gone for it on 41% of qualifying fourth-and-2 opportunities, making him the only head coach with a minimum of three seasons who has gone for it on more than 30% of fourth-and-2s. Frank Reich is second at 29%, with Hue Jackson and Mike Vrabel at 24%.
  • The other specific situation we track is going for it between the opposing 31 and 37 instead of kicking a field goal or trying a coffin-corner punt. Three head coaches with a minimum of three seasons went for it at least 50% of the time in these situations. Matt Nagy leads at 74%, followed by Dave Campo (!) at 61% and then Coslet at 60%.

The best example of a longtime head coach getting more aggressive over the last three years is John Harbaugh. Harbaugh's Aggressiveness Index through 2017 was 1.04. His AI over the last three years is 2.74, which would be the highest of all time for any head coach with at least one year. Another example, though not as striking, is Andy Reid. Reid's AI through his long career until 2017 was 0.81. His AI over the last three years is 1.43.

Bill Belichick, on the other hand, has stayed the same as the league changes around him. His AI through 2017 was 1.33. His AI for the last three years is 1.38.

Aggressiveness Index, 1983-2020
(min. 3 seasons)
Rank Coach Years AI Att Opps Rate Exp Att
1 Pederson 5.0 1.89 83 527 15.7% 43.8
2 Nagy 3.0 1.68 34 305 11.1% 20.3
3 Vrabel 3.0 1.59 23 257 8.9% 14.4
4 Coslet 7.8 1.54 95 796 11.9% 61.6
5 Haslett 6.8 1.49 63 694 9.1% 42.2
6 Williams 3.5 1.45 33 347 9.5% 22.8
7 Payton 14.0 1.44 144 1264 11.4% 100.2
8 Reich 3.0 1.41 40 274 14.6% 28.3
9 Jackson 3.5 1.41 28 352 8.0% 19.8
10 Henning 7.0 1.40 80 743 10.8% 57.1
11 McVay 4.0 1.38 41 397 10.3% 29.6
12 Harbaugh, John 13.0 1.36 127 1408 9.0% 93.1
13 Parcells 19.0 1.36 243 2144 11.3% 178.3
14 McDermott 4.0 1.35 38 402 9.5% 28.1
15 Walton 7.0 1.33 78 768 10.2% 58.6
16 Belichick 26.0 1.33 280 2647 10.6% 210.4
17 Wyche 12.0 1.31 102 1134 9.0% 78.1
18 Coryell 3.5 1.30 28 325 8.6% 21.5
19 Shurmur 4.0 1.30 29 409 7.1% 22.3
20 Schottenheimer 20.5 1.29 193 2160 8.9% 149.6
21 Ryan, Buddy 7.0 1.29 58 794 7.3% 45.0
22 Meyer 6.0 1.24 54 609 8.9% 43.6
23 Ditka 13.0 1.23 149 1407 10.6% 120.7
24 Del Rio 11.9 1.23 121 1225 9.9% 98.4
25 Tobin 4.6 1.22 32 477 6.7% 26.2
26 McCarthy 13.8 1.22 123 1341 9.2% 101.2
27 O'Brien 6.3 1.20 58 678 8.6% 48.4
28 Kotite 6.0 1.19 47 630 7.5% 39.4
29 Quinn 5.3 1.18 43 475 9.1% 36.3
30 Jauron 8.9 1.18 81 991 8.2% 68.5
31 Stallings 3.7 1.18 28 371 7.5% 23.7
32 Kelly 4.0 1.18 31 420 7.4% 26.3
33 Bradley 3.9 1.17 26 406 6.4% 22.1
34 Koetter 3.0 1.16 14 261 5.4% 12.0
35 Marchibroda 7.0 1.16 52 678 7.7% 44.7
36 Johnson 9.0 1.15 85 976 8.7% 74.0
37 Rhodes 5.0 1.14 41 545 7.5% 36.0
38 Mora Jr. 4.0 1.14 35 410 8.5% 30.8
39 Rivera 9.8 1.14 75 968 7.7% 66.0
40 Zimmer 7.0 1.13 53 680 7.8% 46.9
41 Lewis 16.0 1.11 127 1651 7.7% 114.6
42 Gase 5.0 1.10 30 486 6.2% 27.3
43 Shanahan, Mike 19.3 1.09 156 1970 7.9% 142.5
44 Martz 5.3 1.09 39 464 8.4% 35.7
45 Shula, Dave 4.4 1.09 33 435 7.6% 30.2
46 Seifert 11.0 1.09 96 1018 9.4% 88.2
47 Tice 4.1 1.07 25 371 6.7% 23.3
48 Phillips, Wade 9.1 1.07 76 918 8.3% 71.2
49 Lynn 4.0 1.06 28 367 7.6% 26.4
50 Wannstedt 10.6 1.05 91 1107 8.2% 86.7
51 Kubiak 9.8 1.04 79 991 8.0% 75.7
52 Cowher 15.0 1.04 134 1611 8.3% 128.4
53 Ross 8.6 1.04 67 921 7.3% 64.3
54 Smith, Mike 7.0 1.04 51 676 7.5% 49.1
55 Morris 3.7 1.03 28 353 7.9% 27.1
56 Carroll 15.0 1.03 113 1542 7.3% 109.3
57 Gregg 5.0 1.03 33 512 6.4% 31.9
58 Shula, Don 13.0 1.03 117 1169 10.0% 113.5
59 Caldwell 7.0 1.03 45 671 6.7% 43.7
60 Tomlin 14.0 1.02 108 1410 7.7% 106.3
61 Erickson 6.0 1.02 36 636 5.7% 35.5
62 Marrone 6.0 1.01 41 664 6.2% 40.6
63 Arians 7.8 1.01 48 787 6.1% 47.6
64 Ryan, Rex 7.9 1.00 56 872 6.4% 55.9
65 Mularkey 5.0 1.00 37 578 6.4% 37.1
66 Mangini 5.0 0.99 36 485 7.4% 36.3
67 Fisher 22.2 0.99 146 2104 6.9% 148.1
68 Levy 11.4 0.98 87 1159 7.5% 88.6
69 Gruden, Jay 5.3 0.97 33 513 6.4% 34.1
70 Campo 3.0 0.97 22 319 6.9% 22.8
71 Crennel 5.9 0.96 40 566 7.1% 41.5
72 Childress 4.6 0.96 32 472 6.8% 33.3
73 Hanifan 3.3 0.95 25 348 7.2% 26.3
74 Gailey 5.0 0.95 32 507 6.3% 33.7
75 Dungy 13.0 0.94 97 1254 7.7% 102.7
76 Shanahan, Kyle 4.0 0.94 28 374 7.5% 29.8
77 Munchak 3.0 0.94 21 320 6.6% 22.4
78 Whisenhunt 8.0 0.94 43 768 5.6% 46.0
79 Burns 6.0 0.93 54 659 8.2% 57.9
80 Spagnuolo 3.3 0.93 20 360 5.6% 21.5
81 Mariucci 8.7 0.93 61 882 6.9% 65.7
82 Gibbs 14.0 0.92 102 1482 6.9% 111.2
83 Glanville 8.1 0.92 56 757 7.4% 61.1
84 Marinelli 3.0 0.90 18 274 6.6% 19.9
85 Reid 22.0 0.90 150 2314 6.5% 167.0
86 McGinnis 3.4 0.89 22 332 6.6% 24.6
87 Coughlin 20.0 0.89 134 2083 6.4% 150.3
88 Harbaugh, Jim 4.0 0.89 35 474 7.4% 39.5
89 Fassel 7.0 0.87 44 807 5.5% 50.3
90 Smith, Lovie 11.0 0.87 71 1225 5.8% 81.3
91 Shell 6.8 0.87 39 647 6.0% 44.7
92 Davis 3.7 0.87 22 393 5.6% 25.3
93 Garrett 6.5 0.86 57 869 6.6% 66.3
94 Nolan 3.4 0.86 17 356 4.8% 19.8
95 Walsh 6.0 0.86 43 650 6.6% 50.2
96 Noll 9.0 0.85 59 970 6.1% 69.2
97 Vermeil 8.0 0.85 43 775 5.5% 50.7
98 Capers 8.0 0.84 50 876 5.7% 59.3
99 Fontes 8.3 0.84 40 741 5.4% 47.5
100 Philbin 4.3 0.83 18 351 5.1% 21.8
101 Berry 5.5 0.82 37 656 5.6% 45.3
102 Edwards 8.0 0.82 45 811 5.5% 55.2
103 Turner 14.8 0.82 81 1398 5.8% 99.3
104 Green 12.9 0.81 73 1249 5.8% 90.3
105 Schwartz 5.0 0.81 29 511 5.7% 36.0
106 Bowles 4.0 0.81 23 440 5.2% 28.5
107 Sparano 4.6 0.80 27 475 5.7% 33.8
108 Pagano 5.3 0.79 28 530 5.3% 35.3
109 Gruden, Jon 14.0 0.79 88 1456 6.0% 111.2
110 Sherman 6.0 0.78 39 621 6.3% 49.7
111 Flores, Tom 8.0 0.78 44 845 5.2% 56.4
112 Holmgren 17.0 0.77 106 1710 6.2% 137.9
113 Infante 6.0 0.76 31 576 5.4% 40.5
114 Rogers 3.7 0.76 23 376 6.1% 30.4
115 Robinson 9.0 0.74 54 922 5.9% 72.5
116 Campbell, Marion 5.8 0.73 28 619 4.5% 38.3
117 Reeves 20.8 0.72 97 2104 4.6% 135.3
118 Mora Sr. 14.5 0.71 69 1409 4.9% 96.6
119 Fox 15.8 0.71 76 1630 4.7% 106.6
120 Knox 12.0 0.71 54 1141 4.7% 76.1
121 Bugel 5.0 0.70 37 482 7.7% 53.1
122 Frazier 3.4 0.69 13 339 3.8% 18.8
123 Pardee 4.6 0.68 6 140 4.3% 8.8
124 McCoy 4.0 0.66 17 367 4.6% 25.7
125 Switzer 4.0 0.64 19 361 5.3% 29.6
126 Jones 3.6 0.62 14 320 4.4% 22.5
127 Perkins 3.8 0.59 12 360 3.3% 20.5
128 Landry 6.0 0.57 22 630 3.5% 38.4
129 Riley 3.0 0.55 10 340 2.9% 18.2
130 Billick 9.0 0.52 43 1062 4.0% 82.7
131 Mackovic 4.0 0.51 14 450 3.1% 27.4

Comments

13 comments, Last at 17 May 2021, 6:42pm

1 Mouse Davis?

The head coaches with a minimum of three seasons who were least likely to go for it on fourth-and-1 include Mouse Davis ...

Mouse Davis was a head coach in college, the USFL, the WLAF, and Arena, but never in the NFL. Butch Davis, maybe?

3 Bruce Coslet

Is one of the most aggressive coaches of all time? The same Bruce Coslet who kicks a FG on first down at the 11 yard line in OT? Fooled me.

12 Loser

In reply to by trammo71

Didn’t this loser once punt on third down?

4 Coach Marty

RIP Marty Schottenheimer. He was almost as aggressive as Belichick? Wowsers!

10 Indeed.

In reply to by Testicular Tactics

My recollection is that Marty had a reputation as highly conservative, so it's a surprise to me as well.

11 Marty's reputation was more…

In reply to by serutan

Marty's reputation was more going super run-heavy with a lead more than specifically fourth down decisions -- just a different way to be conservative.

5 Belichick

"Bill Belichick, on the other hand, has stayed the same as the league changes around him. His AI through 2017 was 1.33. His AI for the last three years is 1.38."

Is there a break for Belichick between 2009 and 2010? Anecdotally, most Pats fans feel that the infamous "failed" 4th and 2 vs the Colts in 2009 caused Belichick to become waaaaay less aggressive. Wondering if the statistics back that up.

("Failed" is in quotes because I and probably most other Pats fans still think that Faulk's forward progress made the line to gain...)

6 Belichick

In reply to by MJK

Here's what is fascinating. The line for Belicihck isn't between 2009 and 2010. It's between 2010 and 2011. I put together Belichick's numbers for ESPN The Magazine back when it still existed and you can see the break:

2007 1.92
2008 1.51
2009 1.58
2010 1.82
2011 1.14
2012 0.89
2013 1.06
2014 1.13
2015 0.84
2016 1.11
2017 1.09

Then things have gone back up the last three years as the league went up. 1.29 in 2018, 1.39 in 2019, and 1.51 in 2020.

7 That is fascinating.  2010…

In reply to by Aaron Schatz

That is fascinating.  2010 was one of their best seasons offensively.  I wonder what prompted Belichick to suddenly become more conservative.  True, they attempted and failed at two 4th down conversions in the divisional playoff loss to the Jets (one of them a fake punt), but I wouldn't think that is what "broke" Belichick's aggressiveness.

The only other thing that changed that I can think of was that 2011 was the year that Bill O'Brien was promoted to offensive coordinator.  He'd been apparently unofficially calling plays in 2010, but he was full OC starting in 2011.  I wonder if he was significantly more conservative...  Per your table above, O'Brien as a head coach had a career AI of approximately 1.2, which is about what Belichick fell to in 2011...

8 Kliff Kingsbury the AI surprise

Here are your comments on Kliff Kingsbury from your prior article.

Kingsbury is a surprising No. 1 in AI because he is not judged kindly by WPA-based measures of fourth-down aggressiveness. He went for it a lot, with a league-leading 21 fourth-down gos that qualified for AI. But those were balanced out by some egregious errors, in particular the decision to have Zane Gonzalez try a 49-yard field goal with 1:58 left, losing to Miami by 3 in Week 9. Both the EdjSports model and Ben Baldwin's model had this as the worst fourth-down mistake of the season, and that counts a lot more in a WPA-based measure than it does in Aggressiveness Index, where every decision has the same weight.

Kingsbury, no matter how aggressive he has become, will always have the game listed below. This was only the second NFL game that Kingsbury coached and I left the stadium thanking this guy for helping the Ravens win. I found out that night that this game was the only NFL game in history in which a kicker made 3 FG's where the line of scrimmage was the 4 yard line or closer to the end zone. Arizona could have won this game, were it not for such foolishness. Remember, this Ravens team ended up 14-2 and number 1 in DVOA.

https://www.espn.com/nfl/game/_/gameId/401128061

I was amazed to see Kingsbury atop the AI list considering that he has only coached two seasons, and thus, the game referenced above makes up 3% of his coaching career. I am not amazed to see that the EdjSports model shows that he makes poor decisions regarding WPA.

To the commenter that corrected me regarding the spelling of Kingsbury's name during the regular season, I now have it spelled correctly, Kliff (not Cliff) Kingsbury. So I present to you and all FO readers a new vocabulary word: Kliffhanger.

Kliffhanger-- A close game coached by Kliff Kingsbury in which his team loses in large part due to his poor coaching decisions.

13 Reich? Jeff Fisher? and more!

Articles like this are a big reason I shamelessly love FO.
I am pretty surprised Reich is as low as he is (not in top-12 with the 1 season min, but #8 with a 3-season minimum sounds about right, I guess). Maybe it's just in contrast to previous conservative coaches Pagano and Dungy. (despite Manning gesturing to go for it fairly often--I guess he wasn't really in charge after all)
What's surprising about Jeff Fisher, for me, is that he was a HC FOR 22 FREAKIN' YEARS?!?! Is that possible? I just can't believe that. I'd think 10-12 max. Wow. And his AI score doesn't surprise me one bit, despite the one Colts game in which he on-side kicked 3-4 times because he thought that was his only chance. And I suppose he was right.
This is really good stuff.